

Resilience Analytics for Infrastructure under Compounding Threats: Methodology and Case Studies

Emily Wells, PhD and Igor Linkov, PhD Engineer Research and Development Center Risk and Decision Science Team

Battelle Innovations for Climate Resilience Resilience of Infrastructure Systems







The Great

Influenza

What are compounding threats?

The New Hork Times https://nyti.ms/3kbur88

Hurricane, Fire, Covid-19: Disasters Expose the Hard Reality of Climate Change

Twin emergencies on two coasts this week — Hurricane Isaias and the Apple Fire — offer a preview of life in a warming world and the steady danger of overlapping disasters.

By Christopher Flavelle and Henry Fountain

Aug. 4, 2020 Updated 1:47 p.m. ET



90.5<mark>™</mark>■§

DONATE

CLIMATE

Our Future On A Hotter Planet Means More Climate Disasters Happening Simultaneously

September 2, 2021 · 5:12 AM ET



DAN CHARLES

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Compound threats pose multiplicative risks and are projected to increase in frequency, severity, and complexity

- When two or more threats interact, potential collective losses can be greater than the sum of its parts (Resilient Cities Network; IPCC, 2022)
- Risks posed by and to physical-cybersocial systems (IPCC, 2022)
 - Rare, even novel
 - Uncertainty
 - Complexity
- Expected to increase in frequency, severity, and complexity with climate change and interdependencies between critical infrastructure systems (Zscheischler et al., 2018; Kruczkiewicz et al., 2021)





Figure source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022)


Systems resilience of critical infrastructure






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Systems resilience further complicated by compound threats



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Critical infrastructure systems resilience: Integrate multiple domains to inform model and operational decision-making



Source: Linkov, I., Carluccio, S., Pritchard, O., Ní Bhreasail, Á., Galaitsi, S., Sarkis, J., & Keisler, J. M. (2020). The case for value chain resilience. *Management Research Review*, *43*(12).

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Case studies on critical infrastructure resilience under compounding threats

Massachusetts Healthcare Infrastructure

COVID-19 Pandemic


Hurricanes

California Freight
Transportation
Network Resilience

Congestion Refueling

Natural Hazards


Network Science: Dynamic modeling of complex, interconnected critical infrastructure systems



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Case Study 1: Modeling the healthcare infrastructure needs during the compounding threats of the COVID-19 pandemic & hurricanes

Flood Inundation Modeling



Data: NOAA storm surge inundation using P-Surge

Modeling of Pandemic Consequences




Data: Critical facility locations, capacities

Outcomes

- •PPE needs for shelter workers and emergency management personnel
- Additional shelters to maintain social distancing
- •Resource needs to maintain functionality of critical healthcare facilities
- Vulnerable community impacts (e.g. elderly)

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Evacuation support tool: Critical facilities at risk of inundation



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Prob. of						
Exc. (%)	Facility Type	Facility Name	Street	City	State	Zip
74	Hospital	Mount Auburn Hospital	330 Mount Auburn St 02138	Cambridge	MA	02138
74	Hospital	Lawrence General Hospital	One General St 01842	Lawrence	MA	01842
79	Hospital	Boston Med Ctr - East Newton Campus	88 East Newton St	Boston	MA	02118
80	Hospital	Boston Med Ctr - Harrison Ave. Campus	818 Harrison Ave	Boston	MA	02118
100	Hospital	Somerville Hospital	230 Highland Ave 02143	Somerville	MA	02143
100	Hospital	Tobey Hospital	43 High St	Wareham	MA	02571
100	Hospital	Addison Gilbert Hospital	298 Washington St 01930	Gloucester	MA	01930
100	Hospital	Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary	243 Charles St	Boston	MA	02114
100	Hospital	Mass. General Hospital	55 Fruit St	Boston	MA	02114
100	Hospital	Cambridge Hospital	1493 Cambridge St 02139	Cambridge	MA	02139
100	Hospital	Tufts Medical Center	800 Washington St	Boston	MA	02111

Probability of exceedance given inundation depth = 1 ft

Evacuation support tool: Displaced persons at the county-level to estimate shelter demand

- Data: Hurricane Evacuation Studies (HES), developed by USACE under the National Hurricane Program (NHP) with FEMA.
- HESs provide results of socioeconomic and behavioral analyses to estimate shelter demand given storm intensity in terms of displaced persons.

					F	ercent Disabl	ed
	Evacuation Order Extent	Location		Displaced Persons	Hearing	Vision	Ambulatory
MEMA Region	Zone B & C	Region 1		55029	2.4%	2.6%	7.1%
		Region 2			3.5%	1.6%	5.6%
County	Zone A	Barnstable	Г	7372	4.2%	2.2%	6.0%
	Zone B	Bristol		6991	4.2%	2.0%	7.6%
		Dukes	Г		NA	NA	NA
	Zone A	Essex		6017	2.8%	1.8%	6.0%
	Zone B & C	Middlesex	Г	17826	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%
	Zone B	Nantucket		863	NA	NA	NA
		Norfolk			2.7%	1.6%	4.7%
		Plymouth			3.5%	1.6%	5.6%
	Zone B & C	Suffolk		27305	2.4%	2.6%	7.1%
City		Acushnet			4.2%	2.0%	7.6%
Town	Zone B	Aquinnah		39	NA	NA	NA
Community	Zone A	Arlington	Г	581	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%
		Barnstable			4.2%	2.2%	6.0%
	Zone B	Belmont	Г	484	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%
	Zone B	Berkley		106	4.2%	2.0%	7.6%
	Zone B	Beverly		755	2.8%	1.8%	6.0%
	Zone C	Boston		23169	2.4%	2.6%	7.1%
		Dauena			A 20/	2 20/	c n0/

Evacuation support tool: Displaced persons with disabilities at the county-level to estimate shelter demand


- Critical to ensure that those who are deaf, vision-impaired, or have other functional or access needs are accommodated.
- Data: 2018 American Community
 Survey data on the percentage of
 population within each New England
 county with a given disability.

				Р	ercent Disable	ed
	Evacuation Order Extent	Location	Displaced Persons	Hearing	Vision	Ambulatory
MEMA Region	Zone B & C	Region 1	55029	2.4%	2.6%	7.1%
		Region 2		3.5%	1.6%	5.6%
County	Zone A	Barnstable	7372	4.2%	2.2%	6.0%
	Zone B	Bristol	6991	4.2%	2.0%	7.6%
		Dukes		NA	NA	NA
	Zone A	Essex	6017	2.8%	1.8%	6.0%
	Zone B & C	Middlesex	17826	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%
	Zone B	Nantucket	863	NA	NA	NA
		Norfolk		2.7%	1.6%	4.7%
		Plymouth		3.5%	1.6%	5.6%
	Zone B & C	Suffolk	27305	2.4%	2.6%	7.1%
City		Acushnet		4.2%	2.0%	7.6%
Town	Zone B	Aquinnah	39	NA	NA	NA
Community	Zone A	Arlington	581	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%
		Barnstable		4.2%	2.2%	6.0%
	Zone B	Belmont	484	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%
	Zone B	Berkley	106	4.2%	2.0%	7.6%
	Zone B	Beverly	755	2.8%	1.8%	6.0%
	Zone C	Boston	23169	2.4%	2.6%	7.1%
		Dourno		A 20/	2 20/	c 00/

Evacuation support tool: PPE needs for shelter and emergency management personnel

		COVID Scenario - Reuse							
	Pre-Storm								
	PPE / Client	PPE / Staff	Total PPE	PPE / Client	PPE / Staff	Total PPE	Total PPE		
N95 Respirators	NA	1,175	1,175	NA	548	548	1,723		
Face Masks	2,447	979	3,426	NA	NA	NA	3,426		
Eye Protection	NA	1,175	1,175	NA	548	548	1,723		
Gowns/Coveralls	NA	1,175	1,175	NA	548	548	1,723		
Gloves (singular)	NA	77,521	77,521	NA	36,176	36,176	113,697		
Liquid-Gel Thermometers	2,447	NA	2,447	NA	NA	NA	2,447		

		COVID Scenario - No Reuse							
		Pre-Storm			Post-Storm				
	PPE / Client	PPE / Staff	Total PPE	PPE / Client	PPE / Staff	Total PPE	Total PPE		
N95 Respirators	NA	7,047	7,047	NA	3,289	3,289	10,336		
Face Masks	7,341	2,936	10,277	3,426	1,370	4,796	15,074		
Eye Protection	NA	7,047	7,047	NA	3,289	3,289	10,336		
Gowns/Coveralls	NA	7,047	7,047	NA	3,289	3,289	10,336		
Gloves (singular)	NA	77,521	77,521	NA	36,176	36,176	113,697		
Liquid-Gel Thermometers	2,447	NA	2,447	NA	NA	NA	2,447		



Case studies on critical infrastructure resilience under compounding threats

Massachusetts Healthcare Infrastructure

COVID-19 Pandemic

Hurricanes

California Freight
Transportation
Network Resilience


Congestion Refueling

Natural Hazards


Case Study 2: Resilience-By-Design Approach to Minimizing Freight Disruption – Identifying Zero-Emission Refueling Stations in California

Identify gas stations that could be converted to dispensing stations:

- minimize freight displacement
- scalable
- considering natural hazard disruptions



Freight network demand – traffic congestion and fuel consumption



Compounding threat of wildland fires to identify system vulnerabilities

- Freight volumes with climate change vulnerabilities:
 - Wildland fire risk through early 2045
- Result:
 - Network disruption near Stockton, CA
 - N/S freight corridors are close
 - Near-term wildland fire risk
 - Potential post-fire flood risk

Volume of Long-Haul Freight within CA



Overlayed with Caltrans Fire Vulnerability



What is needed to further develop our understanding, modeling, and decision-making towards compound threat resilience?

- Current state of the literature focuses primarily on multi-hazard risk assessments
- Need for resilience-based, dynamical complex systems modeling
 - Discover and include non-obvious real-world relationships resulting from unknown behavior

Preparation	Response	Recovery	Adaptation
 Compound hazard likelihood and types Critical infrastructure and population vulnerabilities System interdependencies 	 Strains on first response and hazard management community Operations and management decisions Coordination and governance approaches 	 functions, and interest Predict recovery to big data that monitoring and after continuous 	rajectories by integrate tors social systems ompound events ss test recovery and

Thank you!

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BACKUP SLIDES

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Need for strategic stress testing of critical infrastructure systems to move beyond multi-hazard risk assessments to resilience assessments






Fig. 1. Tiered approach to integrated risk and resilience stress testing for critical infrastructure.

Source: Linkov, I., Trump, B. D., Trump, J., Pescaroli, G., Hynes, W., Mavrodieva, A., & Panda, A. (2022). Resilience stress testing for critical infrastructure. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 103323.

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
- Transition from risk- to resilience-based analytics
- Systems Approach to systemic risks combining epidemiological, infrastructure and public health models and evaluation





Coding Scheme – Summary of Key Parameters Collected for Each Article

- Methodology: Novel modeling approa
 Case study? Lit review?
- Data type: Simulated, Empirical, Both
- Critical infrastructure type(s)
- Event type(s)
 - Compound threat, Cascading fail.
 Both
- Modeling approach
 - Sources of uncertainty
- Direct measure of resilience?
 - If so, name of approach
- Coverage of Resilience Matrix
- Results presentation (i.e., geospatial, scenario analyses, time series analys etc.)




	Physical	State and capability of equipment and personnel, network structure	Event recognition and system performance to maintain function	System changes to recover previous functionality	Changes to improve system resilience
Resilience Domains	Information	Data preparation, presentation, analysis, and storage	Real-time assessment of functionality, anticipation of cascading losses, and event closure	Data used to track recovery progress and anticipate recovery scenarios	Creation and improvement of data storage and use protocols
Resil	Cognitive	System design and operation decisions, with anticipation of adverse events	Contingency protocols and proactive event management	Recovery decision- making and communication	Design of the new system configurations, objectives, and decision criteria
	Social	Social network, social capital, institutional and cultural norms, and training	Resourceful and accessible personnel and social institutions for event response	Teamwork and knowledge sharing to enhance system recovery	Addition of or changes to institutions, policies, training programs, and culture

Fig. 1. The Resilience Matrix definitions of the phases and domains of critical infrastructure resilience used to code the literature, as adapted from Linkov et al. [39]. This figure shows the general progression of resilience phases over time following an adverse event (i.e., a threat or hazard).


Literature review

- How has the network science literature modeled and assessed critical infrastructure resilience under compounding threat spaces?
- What types of such threats and critical infrastructure systems have been studied in recent years?
 How have they been studied?
- How does this body of literature relate to overall systems resilience of critical infrastructure?

A.) Critical Infrastructure Type



B.) Threat Type



Systematic literature review: Network science approaches (n = 71) focused on physical and information absorption...

RESILIENCE PHASES

		Prepare	Absorb	Recover	Adapt
DEOU IENOE	Physical	58%	85%	63%	39%
RESILIENCE DOMAINS	Information	59%	79%	59%	42%
·	Cognitive	45%	48%	39%	31%
	Social	25%	30%	28%	20%

Source: Wells, E. M., Boden, M., Tseytlin, I., & Linkov, I. (2022). Modeling critical infrastructure resilience under compounding threats: a systematic literature review. Progress in Disaster Science, 100244.

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RESILIENCE PHASES

Systematic literature review:

...but needed focus for other phases and the cognitive and social domains

RESIL	IENCE
DOM	ZINIC

	-			
	Prepare	Absorb	Recover	Adapt
Physical	58%	85%	63%	39%
Information	59%	79%	59%	42%
Cognitive	45%	48%	39%	31%
Social	25%	30%	28%	20%

Source: Wells, E. M., Boden, M., Tseytlin, I., & Linkov, I. (2022). Modeling critical infrastructure resilience under compounding threats: a systematic literature review. Progress in Disaster Science, 100244.

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Recover

56%

75%

0%

19%

Adapt

44%

56%

0%

19%

Systematic literature review: Resilience Matrix results by critical infrastructure type

A.) General


Infrastructure	Prepare	Absorb
Physical	56%	100%
Information	56%	100%
Cognitive	19%	0%
Social	19%	19%

B.) Transportation

Systems	Prepare	Absorb	Recover	Adapt
Physical	43%	100%	57%	64%
Information	43%	100%	57%	79%
Cognitive	21%	57%	36%	57%
Social	21%	100%	57%	36%

C.) Electric Systems	Prepare	Absorb	Recover	Adapt
Physical	47%	87%	87%	53%
Information	47%	87%	87%	27%
Cognitive	47%	47%	27%	27%
Social US /	27%	20%	20%	20%


Modeling hurricane evacuations during compounding threats: Case Study on Hurricane Ida, Southeast Louisiana





Source: Cegan, J. C., Golan, M. S., Joyner, M. D., & Linkov, I. (2022). The importance of compounding threats to hurricane evacuation modeling. npj Urban Sustainability, 2(1), 2.

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Use of agent-based modeling to assess systems-level vulnerabilities, risk, resilience for evacuation and








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Disability accommodation in shelters

- During an emergency, it is critical to ensure that those who are deaf, vision-impaired, or have other functional or access needs are accommodated.
- The model addresses these concerns by using census data from the 2018 American
 Community Survey on the percentage of population within each New England county
 with a given disability.

	Displaced
Disability Status	Persons
No Disability	48,370
Hearing Disability	1,321
Vision Disability	1,431
Ambulatory Disability	3,907
Total	55,029



Breakdown of displaced persons by disability status - Massachusetts